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This paper assesses the effects of deposits structure and ownership concentration on risk disclosure 
in Islamic banks. We based on a sample of 71 Islamic banks operating in 12 countries and observed 
over the period 2009-2014. We employed a risk disclosure index covering 9 dimensions. Our paper 
finding suggests that the level of risk disclosure is lower for Islamic banks with higher ownership 
concentration, leveraged bank, listed banks and Islamic banks. However risk disclosure is higher 
for Islamic banks with higher concentration of PSIA and higher foreign ownership, large Islamic 
banks, aged banks, Islamic banks operating in country with higher country transparency index, 
positively correlated to GDP and AAOIFI adoption. By disaggregating total risk disclosure into 
the 9 sub-categories, we are able to specify, also, the components of risk disclosure impacted by 




improve corporate governance mechanisms in Islamic banking system through the optimization of 
ownership structure (dispersed ownership) in order to promote transparency and disclosure. 
Second, regulators and policy makers should revise guidelines in the main purpose to protect 
PSIAs holders (considered as minor shareholders without voting power) through promoting 
disclosure and transparency. Third, our findings can be useful for many international supervisory 
bodies like the IFSB and AAOIFI to evaluate transparency and disclosure standards. 
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The importance of the risk disclosure was stressed for the first time in 1998 by the Institute of 
Charted Accountants in England and Wales, when the institute published a discussion paper 
entitled “Financial Reporting of Risk-Proposals for a statement of Business Risk”. The discussion 
paper suggested for the first time that firms have to disclose risk management information in their 
annual reports.  
 Later  on,  the risk disclosure in the annual reports has attracted the interest of many researchers 
and practitioners (e.g. Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Oliveira et al., 2011; Abdallah et al, 2015, Al-
Hadi et al., 2016; Al-Hadi et al, 2017; Amran et al., 2009; Neifar & Jarboui, 2017; Ntim et al, 
2013; Nobanee  & Ellili, 2017). Previous studies provide evidences that risk disclosure,  is  
associated,  to  the improvement  of the  corporate  risk  management (ICAEW,  2002), the  
reduction  of  the  information  asymmetry (Linsmeir  et  al.,  2002),  the minimization  of  the 
agency  costs (Uddin &  Hassan,  2011), the  protection  of  the  investors (Linsley  &  Shrives,  
2006) and the enhancement of the company’s reputation (Yang, 2007).  
However, previous works assessing the determinants of banks’ risk disclosure in emerging 
economies have many limitations. First, most of these studies focused on one aspect of risk 
reporting such as market risk disclosure (Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Al-Hadi et al, 2017), or operational 
risk disclosure (Neifar & Jarboui, 2017) while banks’ transparency about other major risk types 
(e.g. capital adequacy, liquidity risk..) is important for both market discipline and for their financial 
stability. Second, these papers focused on either financial institution at an aggregate level or on 
Islamic banks within only the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) which show a 





Our paper makes therefore an important contribution to the governance and disclosure literature 
by assessing the risk disclosure practices of 71 Islamic banks operating in 12 emerging economies 
including Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Turkey and UAE over a period of six years (from 2009 to 2014). First, we investigate the 
relatively few explored risk disclosure determinants for Islamic banking firms. Second, we focus 
12 booming economies. Third, we contribute to disclosure studies by being the first study to 
examine the risk disclosure determinants for relatively a large sample of Islamic banks operating 
worldwide. 
As regards the practical implications of our research, we try in this paper to assess the level of risk 
disclosure in Islamic banks and we identify how ownership concentration and deposits structure 
can influence risk disclosure. This seems to be useful for both preparers and users of annual reports, 
for regulators and policy makers. Also, this paper encourages regulators to improve, through the 
optimization of ownership structure (dispersed ownership), the Islamic banking system’s corporate 
governance mechanisms in order to promote transparency and disclosure. In addition, this paper’s 
findings encourage regulators and policy makers to revise guidelines with the main purpose of 
protecting Profit Sharing Investment Account holders (PSIA: considered to be minor shareholders 
without voting power) through promoting disclosure and transparency. Moreover, our findings can 
be useful for many international supervisory bodies, like the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI), in evaluating transparency and disclosure standards. 
This paper is organized as follows: The first section reviews the relevant prior studies and develops 




definition. The third section highlights the research methodology. The fourth section discusses the 
results. The fifth section provides additional tests and the final section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Two theoretical approaches have been proposed to justify risk disclosure practices by non-finance 
and finance companies. An economic theory approach; and a social and political theory approach. 
While the former relies on self-interest and profit maximization of corporate management (e.g. 
agency theory, political costs theory, signaling theory, and proprietary costs theory), the latter 
focuses on the political and social relationships linking companies to stakeholders in the society 
(e.g. resources-based perspectives and legitimacy theory).  Oliveira et al (2013) suggest that the 
use of multi-theoretical approaches seems likely to be fertile and to produce insights beyond those 
revealed in the recent risk disclosure literature.  So far, our cross-countries study is grounded on 
agency theory, political costs theory, resources-based perspectives and legitimacy theory to 
explore the determinants of risk reporting in the banking sector. In the following paragraphs, we 
briefly explain the definitions and unique aspects of these theories and how they may apply to the 
banking industry.  
Agency theory suggests that the information asymmetry between the agent (shareholders) and the 
principal (managers) can be reduced through the implementation of monitoring mechanisms likely 
to promote higher level of information disclosure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because investors 
do not play an active role in corporate management and managers tend to serve their own interests 
(rather than maximizing shareholders’ value), information about risk would reduce investors’ 
uncertainties.  Banks are in essence risk- taking enterprises, and therefore, as a part of good risk 
management system, they are expected to insure an appropriate flow of risk reporting to the 




towards risk exposure, foster banks’ transparency and decrease the information gap between both 
sides (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Linsley & Shrives, 2003; Oliveira et al, 2013). 
The political costs theory states that some companies may be subject to deep scrutiny from politics, 
public and media (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). In such a situation, politically visible firms will 
make accounting choices to counter unwanted attention and avoid costs associated with regulatory 
interventions (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). According to Healy & Palepu (2001), earlier research 
sustains the view that information disclosure choices can be associated with political costs’ 
consideration.  
Companies will manage to overcome such pressure or attention, by disclosing additional 
information so as to manipulate their image positively and to distract attention (Birt et al., 2006; 
Deegan & Gordon 1996). This argument could be particularly applied to interpret banks’ risk 
disclosure practice. Financial institutions operate in highly regulated and visible industry. Such 
regulations may include, for example, minimum capital requirements for banks and financial 
performance constraints for insurance firms. Risk disclosure could be an effective tool to influence 
public opinion about banks’ risk profile, signal their compliance with Basel II requirements and to 
restore their reputations and credibility after the occurrence of global financial crisis. 
Legitimacy theory (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Kaplan & Ruland, 1991; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 
1995; Deegan, 2002; Magness, 2006) explains that an organization has no right to exist unless it 
adheres to the system of values of one society within which the organization operates. To meet 
these social expectations, an organization would alter its activities and comply with outsiders 
’values as a part of its legitimation process (Linsley & Kajüter, 2008; Hassan, 2008). According 
to this theory, banks might knuckle under institutional pressures (such as adherence to Basel II 




resources, and survival capabilities (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Ferna´ndez-Alles & Valle-Cabrera, 
2006). Banks might also exhibit their compliance and conform to any minimum risk disclosure 
requirements to enhance their reputations and widen their customer basis. Chen & Roberts (2010) 
argue however that, despite its importance, legitimacy theory has abstract underpinnings which 
can be further operationalized using resource dependence theory. 
The resource dependence theory is built upon a few clear-cut principles. First, an organization 
needs important resources to survive, grow and pursue its strategies. Second, an organization 
should compete to obtain and control these resources from its outside environment and from rivals. 
Third, power (Organizations possessing necessary resources) and its inverse, dependence 
(organizations depending on others for resources), play key roles in understanding 
interorganizational relationships (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, 2003; Malatesta & 
Smith, 2014). Such resources can be in the form of experienced labor, financial funds, loyal 
customers, and reputation. According to this theory, banks might rely on risk disclosures as an 
effective tool to raise capital at a cheaper cost of capital from the market while minimizing political 
costs through improved corporate image and reputation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011; Pirson & Turnbull, 2011). 
 
2.1 Ownership structure and risk disclosures  
We refer to several firm-specific characteristics that were discussed in recent corporate disclosure 
literature to explore the determinants of risk reporting. 




Large outside shareholders play a critical role in corporate governance, because their sizable stakes 
give them incentives to bear the cost of monitoring the integrity and the efficiency of firms’ 
management (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). Large shareholders exert governance through two 
basic mechanisms. First, they can directly intervene within a firm and voice for a strategic change 
either via a public shareholder proposal, a private letter to management, or through voting against 
directors. Second, they can use share trading strategy and push down stock prices, punishing then 
managers for their misbehavior. The threat of both intervention and exit mechanisms induces 
manager to maximize shareholders’ value (Edmans, 2014).  
In the banking sector, Barakat & Hussainey (2013) argue that block owners have the power to 
influence strategic decisions towards risk management and disclosure because of their strong 
voting rights. For instance, if managers fail to effectively perform their fiduciary duties, major 
shareholders might activate their influential voting rights and remove the underperforming 
executive. Oliveira et al. (2011) suggest however that in banks with major shareholders, agency 
costs are lower as owners tend to appropriate the benefits of monitoring management. This is likely 
to reduce managers’ opportunistic behavior and accordingly the level of risk related information. 
Ntim et al., (2013) contend further, that management of firms with large shareholders may not take 
on disclosure practices because the costs of risk related information i.e., cost of competition, cost 
of litigation, and cost of regulation are most probably greater than its possible benefit i.e., 
information symmetry.  
Surprisingly, empirical research investigating the relationship between block ownership and 
corporate risk disclosure are scarce, with those by Lopes & Rodrigues (2007), Oliveira et al. (2011) 
and Ntim et al., (2013) being notable exceptions. These studies find that block ownership has a 




H1. There is a negative association between block ownership and the extent of Islamic 
bank risk disclosure. 
H2. There is a negative association between highest shareholder ownership and the extent 
of Islamic bank risk disclosure. 
 
 Foreign ownership and risk disclosure 
It is widely held that foreign investors are more sophisticated than local investors due to their 
quality and advanced knowledge about trading and financial market regulations. Choi, Lam, Sami, 
& Zhou, (2012) contend that an increase in foreign ownership leads to a rise in shareholder 
activism and to an improvement in board composition. In this case, local firms are subject to 
greater monitoring system and more refined valuation methods. Nonetheless, foreign investors are 
at an information disadvantage compared with domestic investors (Choe et al., 2005). Indeed, 
Huafang & Jiango (2007) argue that due to space and language barriers, foreign shareholders suffer 
from a higher level of information asymmetry. If so, foreign investors would associate themselves 
with firms offering a rich information environment (Jiang & Kim, 2004). On these terms, pressure 
mounts to the directors to enhance corporate transparency and provide high quality accounting 
information including risk related disclosure (Sami & Zhou, 2004; Mohobbot, 2005).  It follows 
that information asymmetry should decline with an increase in foreign ownership while there is an 
increase in general transparency in the market. 
Empirical finding on the association between corporate disclosure and foreign ownership are 
mixed. While Haniffa & Cooke (2002) and Barako et al. (2006) showed that higher level of foreign 




insignificant association between risk related information and foreign ownership. Hence, we state 
the following hypothesis: 
H3. There is a significant positive association between foreign investors and the extent of 
Islamic bank risk disclosure. 
 
 Government ownership and risk disclosure 
Only few studies discussed the effect of government ownership on corporate disclosure. Sepasi et 
al. (2016) provide evidence that government influence firm’s disclosure. Indeed, firms can increase 
the expectations of state investors that are one of the most important beneficiaries in Iranian firms 
through increasing their disclosure quality. Al Janadi et al. (2016) show that government 
ownership has a moderating negative effect on the association between corporate governance 
factors and voluntary disclosure, which indicates that government ownership plays a negative role 
in the effectiveness of corporate governance. Eng & Mak (2003) argue that significant government 
ownership is associated with increased disclosure. Government ownership increases moral hazard 
and agency problems, and disclosure is a means of mitigating these problems. 
Based on these arguments, we set our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H4. There is a significant positive association between government ownership and the 
extent of Islamic bank risk disclosure. 
 
 Deposit structure and risk disclosure 
As all form of interest-based deposits are forbidden by Shariah law, while at the same time, trade 
and Profit-Loss-Sharing (PLS) arrangements are permitted; Islamic banks mobilize funds from 




source of funding for Islamic banks. PSIAs are involved directly in the Islamic banks’ medium 
and long term financed assets. On average, PSIA count around 62 percent of Islamic banks’ assets 
in 12 countries in the Middle East and South East Asia (Archer & Karim, 2009). Despite all of 
this, investment account holder don’t have a specific privilege. Unlike shareholders, they receive 
no specific privileges, no warranties or voting rights that protect them from the moral hazard 
problem (Archer and Karim, 2009).  
Previous researches demonstrates how mobilizing funds through profit-loss-sharing arrangements 
raise a moral hazard problem. Indeed, many studies discussed the potential conflicts of interest 
existing between equity holders and PSIAs holders (Archer & Karim, 2009; Hamza & Saadaoui 
2013; Grassa 2018). PSIAs encourage Islamic banks’ managers to take more risky decisions and 
to operate with less capital (Visser, 2009). In a highly information asymmetry context, any increase 
of PSIAs funds is likely to be an incentive for managers to opt for riskier investment decisions and 
to increase leverage since the Islamic bank runs no risk and the probability of default is supported 
fully by the investment account holders.  
Hence, one of the key issues related to investment account holders is their powerlessness to mentor 
the bank’s decisions in certain types of risky investment activities. Which can be an incentive for 
the decision makers to opt for risky decisions, henceforth, a creation of a possible conflicts of 
interest with respect to the potential deviation of appetite of risk between the holders of PSIAs and 
shareholders (El-Hawary, Grais & Iqbal 2004).  
Another issue, relating to the PSIAs, is most Islamic banks’ practices to smooth profits over time 
which acts as a mean for hedging against unexpected future low income distributions (Archer, 




information in the financial statements and severely constrain the users of financial statement from 
evaluating the Islamic bank’s actual position (Abdel Karim, 2001). 
Very few researches studied the relation between disclosure and PSIAs concentration. Using a 
qualitative research methodology applied to a sample of 12 Islamic financial institutions from 
Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE and Malaysia, Magalha˜es & Al-Saad’s (2013) findings demonstrate that 
the majority of Islamic banks believe that the quarterly audited financial reports with detailed 
explanations of each item are sufficient information for PSIAs holders. However, this study’s 
findings are limited due to the small size of the sample used.  Grassa, Husseiney & Chakroun 
(2018) provide evidence that PSIAs have a positive impact on products and services disclosure. 
Grassa (2018) demonstrate that PSIA affect positively corporate governance disclosure. Grassa, al 
Halabi and Husseiney (2019) show that PSIAs increase multi-corporate disclosure (Sharia 
disclosure, CSR disclosure and financial disclosure). 
Islamic banks, as equity-based capital structures dominated by shareholders equity and investment 
account holders, are exposed greatly to the massive risk of withdrawal of funds which threatens 
their positions. Therefore, we expect that since increased disclosures might maintain the 
investment account holders, a positive association would be predicted between PSIAs and risk 
disclosure.  
Based on these arguments, we set our fifth hypothesis as follows:  
 








3. Sample, data and methodology 
3.1 Sample and data 
Our dataset is a cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between risk disclosure, deposit 
structure, firm attributes and ownership structure over the period 2009-2014. We use Bankscope 
and the Bankers databases for the sample selection. The Bankers magazine published a survey in 
November 2011 of the top Islamic financial institutions by country. For the sake of consistency in 
our sample, we include banks which provide only financial statements. In addition, we excluded 
subsidiaries from our samples. Therefore, we collect data for 71 Islamic banks from 12 countries 
namely Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Turkey and United Arab Emirates (UAE). The dataset is hand collected from several 
sources including Bankscope, and Zawya database, in addition to the annual reports and websites.  
a. dependent variable: 
To assess the level of risk disclosure across the studied countries, we use a content analysis. 
Krippendorff (1980) trusts that content analysis guarantees repeatability and valid inferences from 
data according to their contexts.  
We collect data from annual reports which cover different aspects of banks’ financial and non-
financial performances. Typically, annual reports provide a review of banks’ activities, their 
position, their risk and capital resources’ management and their business vision for the future. We 
perform the risk disclosures’ analysis of the sample banks in all the narrative sections in the annual 




information, qualitative and forward-looking information increases the overall quality of corporate 
reporting and have considerable value for banks’ stakeholders (Chatterjee, Tooley, Fatseas, & 
Brown, 2011). Narrative sections serve as a tool for managers to disclose “their perspectives of 
the firm to investors, such as why earnings have changed, what liquidity needs the firm faces, what 
capital resources have been or are planned to be used, what material market risks the firm is 
exposed to” (Brown & Tucker, 2011) and what are the future trends that may affect future 
operations. 
We chose to consider risk related information at an aggregated level since the adoption of 
international standards of risk reporting in emerging markets is a vital step in their steady 
integration into the global economic system. It is also worthy to mention that out of our twelve 
investigated countries; eight countries have already required or allowed the use of IFRS by their 
listed financial firms. Besides, the literature on the financial sector shows that these firms disclose 
more comprehensive risk information relative to firms in other industries (e.g., Al-Hadi et al, 2017; 
Hirtle, 2007; Nier & Baumann, 2006; Pérignon & Smith, 2010). Not to mention that most Islamic 
banks in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia or Malaysia are either required to comply or moving 
toward embracing the AAOIFI and IFSB standards at a steady pace.  
Scholars relied on different coding schemes when performing a content analysis. These schemes 
involve the use of either keywords, sentences or pages as a measurement unit. Congruent with 
recent risk disclosure literature (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Amran et al., 
2009; Dobler et al., 2011; Hussainey & Elzahar, 2012; Moumen, Ben Othman & Hussainey, 2015; 
2016) we count the number of risk-related sentences to assess the level of risk disclosure by banks. 
We expect less bias when referring to sentences compared to words since Unerman (2000) 




Krippendorf (2007) argues further that “the meaning of a word typically depends on its syntactical 
role within a sentence”.  
An additional requirement for content analysis is the coding instrument. Our risk assessment 
instrument encompasses significant risk exposure for banks and focuses on eight types of 
disclosures, including capital structure, financial risk, operational risk, financial instruments, 
reserves, segment information, accounting and presentation policies and general risk information. 
We also incorporated two risk sub-components specific to Islamic banks. Extending Nahar, Azim 
and Jubb (2016), we develop our index from 4 main sources: the guidelines provided by the 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7, the Basel II: Market Discipline guideline, 
The AAOIFI and IFSB standards (specific to Islamic banks), and the accounting literature (Cabedo 
& Tirado, 2004; Oliveria, et al. 2011; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Abdallah et al, 2015). Typically, 
we adopted a two steps process. In the first step we made an extensive review of prior studies and 
identified the common items used to assess banks’ risk disclosure.  
We then cluster these items in accordance with regulatory requirements (IFRS 7; Basel II: Market 
discipline; AAOIFI and IFSB standards). In total our risk disclosure index includes 69 items 
grouped into 8 risk sub-categories. To measure the level of risk disclosure by banks, we assign to 
each of these risk items the number of sentences disclosed in banks’ annual reports. We code risk 
disclosures any sentence that informs the reader about “any opportunity or prospect, or of any 
hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has already impacted or may impact upon the 
company, as well as the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat, or 
exposure” (Linsley & Shrives, 2006). 
We ensure the construct validity of our risk disclosure index and the reliability of our scores by 




from multiple and varied sources of information (IFRS, Basel II, AAOIFI, IFSB, prior literature). 
Second, to ensure reproducibility, one single coder performed the content analysis of banks’ annual 
reports (Krippendorff, 2007). Third, an independent evaluator with financial reporting expertise 
coded a sub sample of 25 annual reports to ensure the reliability of the scale. Krippendroff (1980; 
2007) argues that it is important that at least two researchers do this type of analysis independently 
and compare results for reliability checking. Fourth, we compare the risk Disclosure Index coded 
by both academics (the main researcher and the independent evaluator) to ascertain if there were 
any significant differences. Specifically, we perform an inter- rater reliability test to check for 
consistency in coding, and for accuracy of risk disclosures’ scores. We rely on Krippendorff’s 
alpha test, which is the most appropriate test of inter rater reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007; 
Krippendorff, 2010). The test generates a Kalpha of 0.825, a satisfactory level of inter-rater 
reliability for this intra-class agreement coefficient. It is common to require Kalpha = 0.80 as the 





b. Independent variables: 
Table 1: Model specification and variable measurement 
Abbreviated Name Full Name Variable description Data source 
PSIA The Profit Sharing Investment 
Accounts  
Ratio of total deposits subscribing under the category of 
PSIA to total assets. 
Annual report 
Non_PSIA The non-Profit Sharing 
Investments Accounts 
Ratio of total deposits subscribing under the categories of 
currents accounts and non-Investment accounts divided by 
total assets 
Annual report 
BLOCK Number of Blockholders 
 
Number of blockholders– shareholders whose ownership 
≥5 % of total number of shares issued. 
Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
HIGHEST_SH Largest shareholder Percent of shares owned by largest shareholders Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
FOREIGN foreign ownership Percent of shares owned by foreign shareholders Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
GOV Government ownership Percent of shares owned by the government Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 




ROA Return on assets Net income/total assets Annual report: 
Financial statements 
LEVERAGE Leverage Long-term debt/ total assets Annual report: 
Financial statements 
BANKSIZE Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets Annual report: 
Financial statements 
BKAGE Bank age Bank age Bank website 
LIST Listed bank 1 if the IB is listed in the stock exchange, 0 otherwise Stock exchange 
COUTRANSDEX Business extent of disclosure 
index 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating more disclosure. 
World Bank 
 
GDP Gross domestic products  World Bank database 






3.2 Research methodology 
To empirically investigate the relationship between risk disclosure, firm attributes, deposit 
structure and ownership structure, we use the following GLS regression and GMM transformed 
multiple regression models: 
RDi = αi + β1 BLOCK + β2 FORGN + β3 GOV + β4 HIGHEST_SH + β4 PSIA + β6 ROA+ β7 
LEVERAGE+ β8 BANKSIZE + β9 BKAGE + β10 LIST+ β11 COUTRANSDEX + β12 GDP + β13 
AAOIFI + εi 
where RDi: is Risk Disclosure index for bank i, Block: is the number of Blockholders for bank i, 
HIGHEST_SH: is the Percent of shares owned by largest shareholders ; FORGN: Percent of shares 
owned by foreign shareholders for bank i,  GOV: Percent of shares owned by the government for 
bank i, PSIA: ratio of total Profit-Sharing Investment account divided by total assets for bank i, 
ROA: ratio of net income/ total assets , LEVERAGE: ratio of long-term debt/ total assets for bank 
i, BANKSIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets for bank i, BANKAGE: is the age of bank i, LIST: 
1 if the bank is listed in the stock exchange, 0 otherwise, COUTRANSDEX: The index ranges 
from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more disclosure ,AAOIFI: equal to 1 if the bank i use 
AAOIFI standards, 0 otherwise, GDP: is the logarithm napierian of the Gross domestic products 
for each country in the concerned year. 
We use the first-order Taylor-series linearisation method to control for heterosedasticity and to 
produce robust standard errors. In addition, we use both lagged and contemporaneous independent 
variables in Eq. (2). Finally, we use the Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables and model mis-
specification, we also use the variance inflation factors (VIF) to examine whether the independent 




We used, also, the above regression models to examine the association between RD subcategories 
and ownership structure variables. We used the transformed GMM multiple regression for the 
following sub categories of RD (D1: Capital structure and adequacy; D2: Financial risk; D3: 
Operational risk; D4: Financial instruments; D5: Reserves; D6: Segment Information; D7: 
Accounting and presentation policies; D8: General risks information). 
 
4. Empirical results: 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we analyze the results of the risk disclosure index of the 71 Islamic banks during 
the period from 2009 to 2014. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the risk disclosure Index 
scores across countries. The results show that, over the years 2009 to 2014, the average aggregate 
risk disclosure is 366.1.  The index scores show that the extent of disclosure across countries varies 
considerably. Turkey has the highest risk disclosure index score of 662.3, followed by Malaysia 
at 617.4 and Pakistan 448.7. The lowest scores are achieved by Tunisia and Egypt, 20 and 167.8 
respectively.  
Table 3 presents the weighted average risk disclosure index scores during 2009-2014. As reflected 
in the analysis of the country’s risk disclosure, we find that the financial risk dimension generally 
scores highly across all countries whilst the Segment Information scores the lowest. The highest 
disclosure score relates to the financial risk dimension (D2) which is 182.59 for our sample of 
Islamic banks followed by the scores of financial instruments (D4) and accounting and 
presentation policies (D7). On the other hand, the lowest disclosure score relates to Segment 




sample. This finding is consistent with the perception that banks pay relatively little attention to 
segments information whereas the financial risk, financial instruments and accounting and 
presentation policies are areas that successful banks which want to comply with best practice risk 
management would place significant emphasis on.  
Table 4 reports the evolution of risk disclosure index over the period of study. It is clearly observed 
that the average risk disclosure index has increased over the 6 years of observation from 333.9 in 
2009 to 491.3 in 2014. Similarly, the weighted average risk disclosure of the sub-index scores 
(dimensions) has increased considerably over the years. 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the covariates during 2009-2014. The average risk 
disclosure index ranges from 10 to 1684 with an average of 366.1.  Return on assets (ROA) ranges 
from −15% to 52% with an average 2%. 46% of banks constituting our sample are listed in the 
stock exchange. The average age of the banks constituting our sample is 18 years old. The average 
leverage is 64%. The average countries disclosure index is 7.5 (with a minimum of 4 and maximum 
of 10). On average, 54% of the banks constituting our sample use AAOIFI standards. 
Table 5 also reports that the number of block holders range from 0 to 7 with an average of 2 and 
on average the highest shareholders own 54.1% of the shares. On average foreign ownership 
represents 49% of the total share and government shareholders represent 16.3%. The share of PSIA 
account holders count 36.9% of total assets. 
Table 6 reports the outputs of the correlation matrix of the covariates used in the analysis. It is 
clear that there are no significant correlation coefficients greater than 50%, therefore our 





4.2 Regression results 
Table 7 reports the cross-sectional GLS and GMM regressions results for risk disclosure score and 
Table 8 reports the results for the 8 subcategories of risk disclosure. 
Table 7 presents, also, the R2, F-ratio, ß-coefficients and t-statistics for our main model. The 
Fisher’ test is significant in the four GLS models. As reported in Table 7, the GLS model for the 
overall risk disclosure score indicated an adjusted coefficient of determination (R2) 89.3% for 
GLS estimation and 86.3 for GMM estimation. 
For the ownership concentration, we find that there is a negative association between the number 
of block holders and risk disclosure and between the highest shareholder and risk disclosure. 
Therefore, hypothesis H1 and H2, which stipulates that risk disclosure increases with the 
reductions in number of blockholders, are supported. Our finding is consistent with Lopes & 
Rodrigues (2007); Oliveira et al. (2011); and Ntim et al., (2013). Blockholders do have superior 
access to private information including risk disclosure, reducing hence bank management’s 
incentive to disclose such information in their annual reports. As powerful investors, block owners 
might have other efficient means of communicating with banks’ management, for example, one-
to-one meetings.  
Moreover, we find that there is a positive association between foreign ownership and risk 
disclosure. Hence, hypothesis H3 is supported. Our finding is consistent with Haniffa & Cooke 
(2002); and Barako et al. (2006) findings. Higher level of foreign ownership increases corporate 
disclosure. Information asymmetry should decline with an increase in foreign ownership while 




Regarding government ownership, we do not find any association between government ownership 
and risk disclosure. Then, hypothesis H4 is rejected. 
With regards to deposit structure, we find that there is a significant and positive association 
between PSIA and risk disclosure. Thus, hypothesis H5 is accepted. Islamic banks, as equity-based 
capital structures dominated by shareholders equity and PSIAs holders are exposed greatly to the 
massive risk of the withdrawal of funds which threatens their respective positions. The Islamic 
banks increasing their disclosures might maintain the holders of PSIAs. Our finding is consistent 
with Grassa (2018) findings. High concentration of PSIA influence the level of firm disclosure. 
Moreover, our finding is in line with Magalha˜es & Al-Saad’s (2013) study which showed that the 
majority of Islamic banks believed that the quarterly audited financial reports with detailed 
explanations of each item were sufficient information for PSIAs holders. However, as reported by 
Magalhaes & Al-Saad (2013), the practices, implemented by Islamic banks to protect the rights of 
holders of PSIAs, are not effective enough in the light of the standard CG principles.  
In relation to our control variables, we find that leverage is negatively associated to risk disclosure. 
This implies that the level of risk disclosure is not largely influenced by the GCC Islamic banks’ 
agency costs of debt. Our finding is consistent with Aksu & Kosedag’s (2006) findings for the 
Turkish firms. We find, also, a positive association between Islamic bank size and risk disclosure. 
Generally, it is expected that larger banks disclose risk information more often than smaller ones. 
Indeed, larger banks can afford the costs to improve risk disclosure and have more incentive to 
enhance their reputations. This result is consistent with previous studies (Dhouibi & Mamoghli, 
2013; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006). Profitability is not significant in explaining risk disclosure. Our 
finding is consistent with Samaha & Dahawy’s (2010) findings. However, there is a positive and 




Islamic banks disclose more information about risk than younger Islamic banks. AAOIFI adoption, 
countries transparency index and GDP growth influence positively the level of risk disclosure. 
Table 8 reports the results for the 8 subcategories of risk disclosure. The findings of our sub model 





This study contributes to recent Islamic finance and disclosure literature by offering empirical 
evidence on the impact of firm characteristics, ownership concentration and deposits structure on 
risk disclosure for a large sample of 71 Islamic banks operating in 12 countries (namely, Bahrain, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey and 
UAE) which were observed over the period from 2009 to 2014. 
In terms of overall disclosure practice, we find that the overall risk disclosure index increased over 
the 6 years of observations. Furthermore, the index scores show that the extent of disclosure across 
countries varies considerably. Turkey has the highest risk disclosure index score, followed by 
Malaysia and Pakistan. The lowest scores are achieved by Tunisia and Egypt. Moreover, we find 
that Islamic banks pay relatively little attention to segments information whereas the financial risk, 
financial instruments and accounting and presentation policies are areas that successful banks 
which want to comply with best practice risk management would place significant emphasis on. 
Our findings invite bankers and the supervisory bodies to make a greater effort to improve the 
level of risk disclosure for Islamic banks. Low level of disclosure can result of the novelty of the 
idea of disclosure and transparency for the Islamic finance industry. 
With regard to the determinants of risk disclosure, we find that the extent of risk disclosure of 
Islamic banks:  
(i) is lower for Islamic banks with higher ownership concentration, as measured by the 
number of block holders and highest shareholder ownership, higher leveraged bank as 




(ii) Increases with Islamic banks with higher concentrations of PSIA, higher foreign 
ownership, bank size, bank age, the country transparency index, GDP and AAOIFI 
adoption. 
By disaggregating total risk disclosure into the 8 sub-categories, we are able to specify, also, the 
components of risk disclosure impacted by various determinants. 
Our paper findings provide many policy implications. First, through the optimization of the 
ownership structure (dispersed ownership) regulators have to improve the Islamic banking 
system’s risk disclosure mechanisms in Islamic banking system in order to promote transparency 
and disclosure. Secondly, regulators and policy makers should revise guidelines with the main 
purpose of protecting holders of PSIAs (considered to be minor shareholders without voting 
power) through promoting risk disclosure and transparency. Thirdly, our findings can be useful 
for many international supervisory bodies, like the IFSB and AAOIFI, in evaluating transparency 
and disclosure standards. 
This paper’s findings are is subject, also, to a number of limitations. Firstly, there was manual 
scoring of annual reports (subjectivity). Secondly, while some items might have higher 
information content or be more useful than others for users of Islamic banks’ annual reports, no 
weighting is assigned to items. Thirdly, the research focuses exclusively on the 12 countries and 
excludes the other Middle East, Southeast Asia and Far East countries where ownership structure 
and deposits structure might affect risk disclosure differently.  
Despite this paper’s limitations, the authors feel that he has given an important contribution to the 
literature on risk disclosure and governance in Islamic finance by moving the discussion forward 




as a pilot to serve as the basis for further research employing a larger sample and investigating 
other contexts. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the risk disclosure Index by country. 
  Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Numb of 
observed banks 
Aggregate RD Index 
  366.1 153.6 117.0 731.0 71 
 Qatar 
  239.8 96.9 148.0 402.0 4 
Bahrain 
  365.0 148.0 7.0 657.0 23 
Egypt 
  167.8 143.4 13.0 327.0 2 
Jordan 
  257.6 42.6 182.0 318.0 2 
Kuwait  
  414.6 129.0 98.0 654.0 5 
Malaysia 
  617.4 311.1 17.0 1684.0 15 
Pakistan 
  448.7 163.8 292.0 680.0 2 
Saudi Arabia 
  419.7 152.7 66.0 656.0 6 
Tunisia 
  20.0 15.2 1.0 42.0 2 
Turkey 
  662.3 317.1 234.0 1284.0 4 
United Arab 










D1: Capital structure and adequacy; D2: Financial risk; D3: Operational risk; D4: Financial instruments; 
D5: Reserves; D6: Segment Information; D7: Accounting and presentation policies; D8: General risks 
information; 
 
Table 3: Weighted average risk disclosure Index by dimension during 2009-2014 
 
  D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 
Aggregate RD Index 25.29 182.59 9.76 82.06 20.38 0.86 73.48 14.57 
 Qatar 3.38 93.75 1.94 60.13 6.75 0.00 45.81 12.94 
Bahrain 23.70 153.60 8.98 72.03 8.80 0.18 70.73 15.06 
Egypt 10.37 52.40 5.88 26.42 6.95 4.65 32.00 1.82 
Jordan 7.17 84.58 7.67 91.92 9.58 0.00 29.42 13.92 
Kuwait  22.88 182.28 6.44 95.76 8.48 0.20 77.48 13.64 
Malaysia 21.93 271.41 16.23 124.54 29.21 0.00 122.75 10.25 
Pakistan 67.71 182.67 28.04 27.68 5.05 0.80 90.92 14.67 
Saudi Arabia 11.74 224.85 7.65 96.50 16.50 1.62 45.41 14.38 
Tunisia 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Turkey  34.50 305.71 2.93 92.14 87.50 1.14 108.93 29.43 





Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the risk disclosure Index by year: 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Aggregate risk 
disclosure Index 
333.9 367.2 396.8 429.4 489.0 491.3 
D1 16.6 18.2 18.6 20.1 23.6 24.8 
D2 141.6 167.3 176.2 192.8 213.5 211.0 
D3 10.8 11.6 12.1 12.0 12.9 9.9 
D4 61.6 65.0 80.3 87.6 102.8 102.0 
D5 15.4 15.4 13.6 17.6 21.4 19.1 
D6 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.4 
D7 58.8 66.2 71.5 81.1 87.6 81.5 
D8 10.0 12.3 12.6 13.9 15.5 17.5 
  
D1: Capital structure and adequacy; D2: Financial risk; D3: Operational risk; D4: Financial instruments; 















RD: risk disclosure, ROA: Net income/ total assets; LIST: 1 if the bank is listed in the stock exchange, 0 
otherwise; BANKSIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets; BKAGE: Number of years; LEVERAGE: Long-
term debt/ total assets; BlOCK: number of blokholders, HIGHEST_SH: highest shareholder ownership, 
GOV: government ownership; FOREIGN: Percent of shares owned by foreign shareholders; PSIA: Profit 
Sharing Investment Accounts; GDP: Natural logarithm of Gross domestic products; COUTRANSDEX: 




    AVERAGE MEDIAN Sted.dev MIN MAX 
RD   366.1 398.50 242.38 1.00 1684.00 
ROA (%)   0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.15 0.52 
LIST   0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
BKAGE   18 12 16 1 61 
LEVERAGE   0.64 0.67 0.23 0.00 1.42 
COUTRANSDEX   7.50 8.00 2.16 4.00 10.00 
PSIA  0.369 0.204 0.599 0.05 0.763 
BLOCK   2.25 1.00 1.64 0.00 7.00 
HIGHEST_SH  0.541 0.47 0.339 0.0418 1.00 
FOREIGN   0.49 0.231 0.44 0.00 1.00 
GOV  0.163 0 0.281 0 1 




























































































RD 1.000 -0.160* -0.050 0.207** 0.034 0.091 0.446 -0.164** 0.077 0.072 0.065 0.170* 0.103 -0.341** 
ROA -0.064 1.000 0.026 0.167* 0.250 0.232** -0.118* 0.185* -0.069 -0.069* 0.084 -0.152* 0.045* 0.023 
LIST 0.010 0.006 1.000 0.336** 0.201 0.195** -0.416** 0.241* -0.418 -0.412** 0.034 -0.007 -0.179 0.031 
BANKSIZE -0.110** -0.015 -0.084 1.000 0.568 0.371** -0.044 0.017 -0.429 -0.429 0.254 0.345** 0.095 -0.433*** 
BKAGE 0.192* 0.008 0.220** 0.075 1.000 0.257* -0.119* -0.005 -0.256 -0.253* 0.188 0.072 0.027** -0.090 
LEVERAGE -0.026* 0.039 0.227* -0.087 0.308** 1.000 -0.056 0.074* -0.186 -0.186 -0.020** 0.152 0.042** -0.035 
COUTRANSDEX 0.426** -0.009 -0.358** -0.139* -0.095 -0.063 1.000 -0.229 -0.336 0.256** -0.185 0.094 0.165 -0.362** 
BLOCK -0.207** -0.079 0.088** 0.039 0.136** -0.122 -0.144** 1.000 -0.376 -0.143** 0.317*** -0.332** 0.345 0.196* 
HIGHEST_SH 0.129* -0.073 -0.435*** 0.063 -0.200** 0.067 0.283** -0.453 1.000 0.192 -0.046 0.372** -0.033** -0.212** 
FOREIGN 0.026 0.095 -0.345** 0.056 0.247** -0.285** 0.325*** -0.032* 0.154 1.000 -0.320 -0.203 0.036 0.145* 
GOV 0.048 -0.071 -0.052* 0.026 0.300** -0.024** 0.006* 0.081* 0.166 -0.327 1.000 0.106 0.014 0.065 
PSIA 0.238 -0.062** -0.078* 0.059* -0.086* 0.030** 0.116 -0.255* 0.328** -0.072* 0.026 1.000 0.082 -0.277** 
GDP  0.056 0.048 0.054 -0.027 -0.002 0.081 0.125* -0.005 -0.103 -0.063 -0.006* 0.085* 1.000 0.154  
AAOIFI -0.281 0.084 0.037 -0.110 -0.169 -0.111 -0.451** 0.200 -0.420 0.073** -0.239** -0.319*** -0.230 1.000 
 
The upper right half of the table shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients while the lower left half of the table contains Spearman’s rank-order correlations 
coefficients  




RD: risk disclosure, ROA: Net income/ total assets; LIST: 1 if the bank is listed in the stock exchange, 0 otherwise; BANKSIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets; 
BKAGE: Number of years; LEVERAGE: Long-term debt/ total assets; BlOCK: number of blokholders, HIGHEST_SH: highest shareholder ownership, GOV: 
government ownership; FOREIGN: Percent of shares owned by foreign shareholders; PSIA: Profit Sharing Investment Accounts; GDP: Natural logarithm of Gross 




Table 7: Determinants of risk disclosure using a GLS and GMM estimation 
 GLS estimation  GMM estimation 
 Coef T-stat P-value  Coef T-stat P-value 
        
ROA 164.79 0.36 0.72  253.84 1.01 0.312 
LIST -95.7 -2.47 0.015**  -46.81 1.44 0.151 
BANKSIZE 10.387 1.98** 0.05**  20.533 5.23 0.000*** 
BKAGE 3.38 3.34 0.001***  2.782 2.78 0.006*** 
LEVERAGE -273.2 -2.38 0.019**  -240.66 3.83 0.000*** 
COUTRANSDEX 49.82 5.49 0.000***  -25.53 -2.64 0.01*** 
BLOCK -61.11 -5.64 0.000***  -46.878 3.70 0.00*** 
HIGHEST_SH -46.87 2.63 0.001***  -46.878 1.94 0.06* 
FOREIGN 305.229 7.34 0.000***  -10.822 0.29 0.772 
GOV 10.56 0.53 0.89  24.098 0.46 0.648 
PSIA 4.19 3.55 0.001***  48.28 2.21 0.035** 
GDP  92.5 3.55 0.001***  -517.56 -1.31 0.193 
AAOIFI 74.625 2.05 0.04***  -42.89 -1.30 0.197 
        




Model  RE     
P value- Hausman Test 0.000***  0.000**** 
R2  0.8931  0.8631 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, and *significant at 10% level. 
RD: risk disclosure, ROA: Net income/ total assets; LIST: 1 if the bank is listed in the stock exchange, 0 otherwise; 
BANKSIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets; BKAGE: Number of years; LEVERAGE: Long-term debt/ total assets; 
BlOCK: number of blokholders, HIGHEST_SH: highest shareholder ownership, GOV: government ownership; 
FOREIGN: Percent of shares owned by foreign shareholders; PSIA: Profit Sharing Investment Accounts;; GDP: 
Natural logarithm of Gross domestic products; COUTRANSDEX: The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values 




Table 8: Determinants of risk disclosure subcategories 
  D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 
ROA 5.42 -79.47 -19.32 -32.04 -9.005 -3.146 -9.82 4.74 
  (-0.28) (-0.64) (0.82) (0.49) (0.49) (0.52) (1.62) (0.38) 
LIST -1.86 -8.416 -15.11*** -9.98 0.944 0.125 -7.206 3.87*** 
  (0.73) (0.52) (4.92) (1.17) (0.40) (0.16) (0.92) (2.41) 
BANKSIZE 0.66*** 9.36*** 0.401 6.20*** 0.512* -0.063 2.18** 0.247 
  (2.16) (4.79) (1.08) (6.01) (1.78) (0.66) (2.31) (1.27) 
BKAGE 0.154** 1.379*** 0.484*** 0.623*** 0.013 0.118*** 0.137 0.045 
  (1.98) (2.77) (5.11) (2.36) (0.19) (4.89) (0.57) (0.91) 
LEVERAGE -12.085*** -14.43*** 5.97 -7.422*** 3.488 1.706 -5.524*** 2.029 
  (2.46) (3.66) (1.00) (4.51) (0.76) (1.12) (3.64) (0.65) 
COUTRANSDEX 2.08*** 12.92*** 2.39*** 0.501 0.678 -0.091 1.131*** 0.118 
  (3.48) (3.20) (3.13) (0.24) (1.14) (0.46) (5.77) (0.29) 
BLOCK -1.32* -8.64* -2.12*** -4.201* -1.154* 0.309 -6.17*** 0.528 
  (1.73) (-1.78) (2.39) (1.76) (1.61) (1.31) (2.61) (1.09) 
HIGHEST_SH -8.37** 25.17 -13.52*** 12.59 -4.47 0.448 1.94 -2.754 
 (2.15) (1.02) (2.87) (0.96) (1.22) (1.27) (0.16) (1.12) 
FOREIGN 4.09 -0.21 -10.72*** 9.072 7.05*** -1.091 -2.68*** 6.416*** 
 (1.40) (0.74) (3.03) (0.92) (2.58) (1.21) (2.97) (3.47) 
GOV -0.178 27.93 -14.98*** 9.232 5.387 -2.73** -1.05 10.53*** 




PSIA 0.162** 22.24** 1.207 1.61 8.102*** 0.213 10.31* -0.559 
 (2.17) (1.97) (0.56) (1.27) (4.85) (0.39) (1.87) (0.50) 
GDP  --67.51** -25.43** -390683 -8.123 -12.687 -1.06 -5.47 -9.446 
  (2.17) (-1.29) (1.06) (0.78) (0.44) (1.11) (0.57) (0.48) 
AAOIFI 5.54** 4.63*** 1.966 1.66* 9.413*** 0.745 1.49* 1.34 
 (2.14) (2.83) (0.63) (1.91) (3.87) (0.93) (1.85) (0.82) 
                  
Number of observations 798 798 798 798 798 798 798 798 
Adjusted R2 0.6933 0.8338 0.4839 0.7933 0.6332 0.2045 0.7819 0.7428 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, and *significant at 10% level. 
RD: risk disclosure, ROA: Net income/ total assets; LIST: 1 if the bank is listed in the stock exchange, 0 otherwise; 
BANKSIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets; BKAGE: Number of years; LEVERAGE: Long-term debt/ total assets; 
BlOCK: number of blokholders, HIGHEST_SH: highest shareholder ownership, GOV: government ownership; 
FOREIGN: Percent of shares owned by foreign shareholders; PSIA: Profit Sharing Investment Accounts; GDP: 
Natural logarithm of Gross domestic products; COUTRANSDEX: The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values 





Risk disclosure index 
  Capital structure and adequacy 
1 Capital structure  
2 Changes in capital structure 
3 Capital instruments 
4 Capital adequacy    – tier 1 & 2 capital and ratios  
5 Equity Risk 
6 Contingency planning  
7 Capital management strategy  
8 Future capital plans  
  Financial risk 
9 Pricing Risk 
10 Liquidity 
11 Credit  
12 Changes in Interest Rates 
13 Credit Risk Exposure 
14 Insurance Risk 
15 Market Risk 
16 Interest Rate 
17 Exchange Rate  
18 Sensitivity Analysis 
  Operational risk 
19 Operational risk management 




21 Internal audit function/ 
22 Internal control system 
23 Business Disruption and Systems Failures 
24 Legal risks 
25 Compliance risk 
26 Fraud risk (internal/external) 
27 Damage to Physical Assets 
28 Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 
  Financial instruments 
29 Derivatives 
30 Fair value 
31 Cumulative change in Fair value 
32 Hedging Description 
33 Cash flow Hedge 
   Reserves 
34 Reserves 
35 Statutory Reserves 
36 Legal Reserves 
  Segment Information 
37 Geographical Concentration 
38 Customer Concentration 
   Accounting and presentation policies 
39 Risk Management 
40 Objective of Holding Derivatives  




42 Collateral Assets 
43 Financial Assets Impairment  
44 Assets Impairment 
45 Contingent Liabilities 
46 Contingent Assets 
47 Lower of Cost or Market 
48 Contingency 
   General risks information 
49 Concentration of Credit Risk 
50 Customer Satisfaction 
51 High Competition 
52 Commodity 
53 Natural Disasters 
54 Communications 
55 Outsourcing 
56 Reputation  
57 Competition 
58 Weather Conditions 
59 Change in Technology 
  Specific risks information for Islamic Banks 
60 Rate of return risk 
61 Shariah non-compliance risk 
62 Displaced commercial risk 
63 Equity investment risk 




65 Market risk 
66 Fiduciary risk 
   Specific Reserve for Islamic bank  
68 PER 
69 IRR 
 
